

National Origins of State Legislators: Does Where Your State Legislators Come From Affect Economic Growth?

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Cultural and “deep roots” history have been shown to have an effect on Economic growth (Putterman and Weil (2010), Comin Easterly Gong (2010), and Fulford, Petkov & Schiantarelli (2020)). A question arises as to whether ancestral and cultural characteristics are more important in some domains than others. Are their effects more important in the public or private sphere? Here, I create a unique data set of state legislators for each state in the United States from 1900-2000. I estimate the ancestral origin information of the legislators using their surnames. I then use this ancestral origin estimate to assign cultural and deep roots values to each legislator. I run a fixed effects model that keeps identical cultural and deep roots scores of counties within a state constant while allowing for changes in the deep roots and culture of the counties’ state government. This allows me to analyze changes in the deep roots of the public sphere while keeping the private and social spheres constant. . My results indicate that certain traits are more important in the public sphere. Cultural trust is important both at the county level and within legislatures. Early state history is most important within legislatures. By contrast, technological history is very important at the county level but not of significant importance at the state level.

Introduction:

Economists have found culture to be an important factor explaining economic disparities in economic growth. Key cultural values important for economic growth includes trust and respect for the rule of law. Since differences in these traits have been found to be important for growth divergences around the world, Economists have investigated the origins of these traits and found many cultural values to have their origins in the distant past. Furthermore, these values are very slow to change. Thus, people's ancestral values and environments have an effect on their descendants today.

Less attention has been paid to how these ancestral cultures and values are important. In what domains of life do they exert the most influence? Is interpersonal trust more important in the private or public sphere? Will a population with a history of technological innovation maintain that tradition even after their law makers begin to come from populations less prone to innovation? A difficulty in investigating the importance of one domain over another is that the ancestral cultures and values of each domain's population can be highly correlated. The public sphere and private sphere populations usually do not differ significantly. In this paper, I attempt to remedy this problem by examining how changing ancestral demographics, among state legislators in the United States, affect county economic growth, while holding county variation in ancestral demographics constant. I create a unique data set that estimates the ethnic origins of state senators using their surnames. I then assign each member corresponding deep roots and cultural characteristics thus creating an average for the populations of the state legislative bodies.

The resulting data is used to run a fixed effects model to assess how these changing ancestral characteristics within the state legislature affect a county's economic growth while holding county variation in identical characteristics constant. This enables us to see how changes in culture and deep roots within the public sphere affect economic growth separate from their effects in the private sphere. My results suggest that certain characteristics are relatively more important for economic growth in some domains than in others, e.g., a history of state development is important in the public sphere, while a history of technological innovation is not. Trust is important in both public and private spheres.

Section 1 summarizes parts of the cultural and deep roots literature. Section 2 details the creation of the state legislature's data set. Section 3 breaks down descriptive statistics of the state legislatures make up. Section 4 outlines our model. Section 5 reports results. Section 6 concludes.

Deep Roots

The deep roots literature builds on research done on the environmental and geographical determinates popularized by Jared Diamond. (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2013), (Comin, Easterly, Gong 2010), and (Putterman and Weil 2010). It hypothesizes that if the primary way by which geography and environment affect economic growth is through their indirect effect on culture and institutions, then cross-country comparisons need to take into account the ancestral origins of the populations inhabiting any given country.

Putterman and Weil (2010) measure the effect of the earliest adoption of settled agriculture and early state development on a country's GDP per capita and inequality after adjusting for post 1500 A.D. migration patterns. These results indicate that adjusting a modern country's 1500 A.D. ancestry predicts a large amount of current day GDP per capita and income inequality. One third of cross-country inequality in income can be explained by the heterogeneity of the population's ancestral agricultural and political experience. This result is robust to controls for the mini-European and African countries.

Comin, Easterly, and Gong (2010) take Putterman's and Wile's (2010) migration data and use technological adoption rates to predict a country's GDP per capita. The dates of technological adoption go back to 1,000 B.C, 0 A.D, and 1500 A.D. Adoption rates for the first two time periods only measure whether the technology was in use, not how intense the use was. The 1500 A.D. adoption rates measure intensity. These long run growth literature results indicate that ancestral technology adoption in 1500 A.D. is the best predictor of 2000 A.D. GDP per capita. The 1,000 B.C. and 0 A.D. rates predict a country's 1500 A.D. adoption rate, but their effects on A.D. 2000 GDP per capita dissipate after a series of control variables are put in place.

The idea behind long run growth literature is that these historical developments affected peoples' cultures and values, were passed down from parent to child, and do not readily adjust to new environments. There is a large body of literature on this topic best summarized by (Algan and Cahuc 2015). These studies examine World Values Survey results on a host of beliefs that are thought to be important for economic development, such as trust and valuation of education of 2nd and occasionally 3rd and 4th generation migrants. These results indicate that, despite growing up in the host country, 2nd and 3rd generation immigrants' values are more closely aligned with the values of their native country. Convergence does not seem to be significant until the 4th generation.

Most studies look at inherited trust levels, but some have considered views on women in the workplace, value of education, number of preferred children, and even monetary policy. All show

close alignment with immigrants' native country, and the studies that examine real world outcomes of these beliefs, such as educational importance and female work, indicate that these beliefs translate into real world outcomes.

These studies allow us to observe effects on institutions that may take a long time to materialize and provide observers with a large and varied history of migration patterns. One weakness they have is that the vast majority of migration during the A.D.1500 period is colonial in origin, meaning it deals with populations with better institutions moving into areas with worse institutions for purposes of economic development. Such migration is also often aggressive with a goal of replacing, or at least influencing, the host country's institutions. It is possible that while populations from nations with strong economic cultures/institutions dominate a host country's weak economic culture/institutions, the reverse is not the case. Once in place, good institutions may be stable against conflict cultures. This is where study of the United States becomes fruitful.

United States

The United States has a long history of steady waves of immigration from 17 million English, German, and Scots-Irish between 1790-1850, to the age of mass migration, dominated by 20.5 million Irish, Italians, Poles, and Jews, and the post-1965 migration which has seen 65 million migrants primarily from central America and Asia. There have also been some lulls in migration such as 1927-1964.

American immigrants come from very diverse countries with equally diverse development histories. Unlike most large-scale migrations in history, American migration occurs during a time and in a place that has detailed records of exactly who is coming and where they are settling. This level of data keeping, combined with large numbers of immigrants and the long time-spans of migration, make the US the perfect testing ground for examining the effects of deep roots and cultural characteristics on institutions.

Recently developed panel data on county level ancestral make up and GDP per capita by Fulford, Petkov, and Schiantarelli allow for fixed effects analysis to be done on every US county from 1840 to 2011. They use census data to trace the ancestral make up of every county. This measure is superior to all previous demographic break-downs because all other measures lump second generation immigrants into broad ethnic categories (White, Black, Asian, etc.) instead of categorizing migrants by nationality. Ethnic categorization results in an inability to achieve a full measure of a county's deep roots history with trust, agriculture, technology adoption and state history since categories, such as "white Americans," don't have pre 1500 A.D. histories because they did not exist. Most

county data sets show a population of 80%-90% white Americans, which makes any meaningful measurement of cultural attributes moot. Fulford, Petkov, and Schiantarelli look at the census question, “What nation were your parents born in,” to create a measure of ancestral make up and keep track of how it changes through time. This allows them to break down broad ethnic categories, like white American, into national components (British, German, Italian, etc.).

Fulford, Petkov, and Schiantarelli assign certain cultural and historical characteristics to nationalities including, State history, which examines how long the nation’s history of representative government extends into the past, Interpersonal Trust, and the country of origin’s GDP. Fulford, Petkov, and Schiantarelli combine this with new measures of county GDP and income per capita created by combining manufacturing and agricultural output with data on sales and retail. They then test to see how a county’s ancestral make-up affects log GDP/income per capita. The results demonstrate a significant effect for all these characteristics with trust ranking and state history being robust against multiple specifications. A 1-point change in a county’s ancestral trust make-up results in a positive 2.6% change in economic output.

The importance of panel data is highlighted by the fact that a cross-sectional run indicates a negative correlation between trust and output. This results from lower trust, Eastern-European immigrants regularly move to counties with stronger economic conditions while early British settlers, with high trust levels, rarely moved from their settled areas.

The Fulford, Petkov, and Schiantarelli study also ran a regression to study how ancestry diversity affects economic outcomes. They found ancestral diversity to have a positive effect on economic outcomes if the average trust level remained the same. However, diversity of ancestry with varying trust levels had a negative effect on economic outcomes.

Public and Private Domains

A question emerges as to whether the importance of ancestral characteristics depends on the domains and institutions they are expressed in. The Fulford, Petkov, and Schiantarelli results could demonstrate an effect on growth in at least three domains, including productivity rates in team production, shifts from public goods provision to rent seeking, and community social capital.

First, lower trust and education peculiar to diverse ancestry could result in falling productivity rates in team production due to increased shirking and lower work moral as outlined by Williams and O’Reilly (1996) and Parrotta,Pozzoli, and Pytlikova (2015). Second, lower trust and certain political cultures/histories in the public sphere could cause the political process to shift from public goods provision to rent seeking. LA Porta(1999), Habyarimana(2007), North and Weingast (2009).

Finally, lower trust can erode the social capital of a community, which raises the cost of doing business with strangers. Such an erosion leads to increases in transaction costs in the form of larger portions of an area's income going to legal professions, such as lawyers, as demonstrated in Putnam (2000).

This paper focuses on the political domain. North and Weingast have pointed out that one of the key steps a county must take in the development process is the shifting of public activity away from monopoly creation and toward the provision of public goods to allow for the creation of a more productive environment. Multiple studies have been done demonstrating that low levels of population trust and ethnic diversity lead to lower provisions of public goods and increased rent-seeking activities.

The issue here is that ancestral traits, such as low trust, are not exclusive to the public sphere. Ancestral traits, such as trust and history of technological adoption, are properties of the population at large, which means they affect all three possible domains. A test could be done to see how the composition of counties' trust levels affect the provision of public goods such as roads, post offices, and schools. However, there are serious endogeneity issues here. Roads, rail and non, were/are a major attraction for migrants as their access facilitates movement from one area to another. School provision was/is often driven by Republican politicians as a tool to assimilate waves of immigrants into the dominant American culture.

The way to evaluate these issues is to perform an analysis on how the ancestral make-up of state governments affects the economic outcomes of counties with similar ancestral make-ups. This can be done by performing a fixed effects model controlling for counties' ancestral make up.

I will use the county GDP estimates and income per capita developed by Fulford, Petkov, and Schiantarelli (2021) along with their estimate of counties' ancestral make-up to estimate how changes in the ancestral make-up of state governments affect county economic outcomes while controlling for county ancestral make-up.

In order to do this, the creation of a data set that measures the ethnic make-up of the state legislature is necessary. I proceeded to create such a data set by gathering all the names of state senators and using those surnames to estimate their nation of origin. This data is then used in a fixed effects model that controls for counties' ethnicity and other statewide time varying effects.

State Legislature

Information on state legislatures is scarce. Biographical information for members who did not go on to higher political office is almost nonexistent. Surnames of legislators are essential to the

determination of the ethnic make-up of state legislatures.

The names of the legislators can usually be found at the beginning of a state's annual "Journal of The House/Senate." These journals keep records of floor votes, bills, and speeches. The names of all the members are usually listed in the swearing in of the members during the first session of the new congress. When only new members are sworn in it is necessary to go to the previous session's journal for the identities of members who did not stand for reelection. These journals have not been fully digitized, and most are unavailable post 1960. Every state has 'Session Laws' volumes that record all the laws passed in a session. These records have all been digitized and are a source of names for many but not all of a session's members. Another source of surnames is individual state legislature websites. While most official state government websites have no information on legislative members before the early 2000s, several, such as Arizona and Texas, have a full listing of all their historical members.

Using these three sources, I gathered the names of all the members of 45 state senates for the years 1900,1920,1940,1960,1980, and 2000.

Surnames

The scarce biographical information on past state legislators posed significant obstacles to the determination of their ancestral origin. Census data proved to be unreliable in the tracing of ancestry for purposes of determining members' nation of origin. One problem is that many people in the same state have the same name. Unless a name is unique, or we have other biographical information about the individual, it becomes impossible to determine which census name is that of the state legislator.

A second, and more significant, problem is that census records are only open until 1940. Thus, there are, effectively, no records available for those born after 1940. This eliminates most data on members of the 1980s' legislatures and virtually all information on members of the 2000s' legislatures.

It is possible to get a picture of the ethnic make-up of state legislatures by using the surname of each member to estimate their ethnic origin. Using the historical origins of surnames to estimate ethnicity is a somewhat recent phenomenon.

In order to obtain a national origin of surnames I made use of the ancestry resource FamilySearch which collects official records, including censuses, birth certificates, death records, draft information, etc., and gathers data on historical individuals thus allowing people to trace their ancestry. With regard to surnames, they provide two useful pieces of information:(1) the countries in which a surname is most frequently found, and (2) lists of the historical origins of a name using

the information provided by The Oxford Dictionary of American Family Names (Hanks 2003). This results in two different and independent sources for estimating national origin: one estimate is based on the frequency of the name's appearance, and the second is based on its historical origin.

In making estimates of national origin, I use a simple rule-based approach. For the frequency estimate, I assign the surname to the nation in which it is most frequently used. For the historical origin estimate, there can often be multiple origins for a given name. The differing estimates of national origin are rank ordered with no percentage estimate of their likelihood of any particular origin. This may be changing with the anticipated new edition of The Oxford Dictionary of American Family Names. In the absence of that, I used the frequency surname appearances to make my estimation.

The use of frequency estimates in America was excluded. A few hundred names, most likely of English or French origin, occur most frequently in Canada, which had a high French and English migration rate. When this happened, I first ran the data keeping the Canadian migration adjusted estimate of political culture and state history. Later, I replaced the Canadian estimate with the non-colonized nation the name is most frequently found in. This did not change any results.

In order to make sure this estimate captured a semblance of reality, I took a random sampling of 100 names of state legislators and searched out their biographical information either in a journal or the census. I then assigned them their true national origin and tested to see how accurate the methods were. The frequency method correctly predicted the national origin 71% of the time. When wrong, these predictions were still within the same region of the world, such as northern Europe, western Europe, eastern Europe, etc., 88% of the time respectively.

My surname estimate is not an effective tool in estimating the national origin of an individual if the person is African-American. Fortunately, biographical information has been kept of African-American state legislators either in journals, state national archives, or the official home page of state legislatures. Using this information, I did not need to worry about wrongly estimating the national origins of African Americans.

Descriptive Results:

The tables below show the breakdown of the ethnic origins of state senators as estimated by their surnames.

The dominance of English surnames is clear. The English dominate state senates, making up 64%, 59%, and 54% in years 1900, 1920, and 1940 respectively. Scottish and Canadian surnames are close in similarity to English surnames, and, if they are added to English surnames, English

Table 1:

Ancestry	1900	1920	1940	1960	1980	2000
English	64.16%	59.36 %	54.51 %	49.82 %	43.29 %	39.92 %
German	8.15 %	9.09%	10.66 %	11.24 %	13.82 %	13.97 %
African American	0%	0%	.12%	.23%	1.76%	4.73%
Mexico	0.21%	0.48 %	0.67 %	0.64 %	1.87 %	2.56 %
Ierland	9.53 %	9.27%	10.24 %	12.12 %	9.80 %	8.85%
Italian	0.14%	0.18 %	1.09 %	1.76 %	4.36 %	5.57%
Canada	2.90 %	3.33 %	4.00 %	3.51 %	3.57 %	3.01 %
Scottish	8.36	8.96 %	7.57 %	6.21 %	5.84 %	4.79 %
Russian	0%	0.06 %	0.61 %	0.94 %	1.42 %	1.22 %
Polish	0%	0%	0.24 %	0.23 %	0.68 %	0.72 %
Austrian	0%	0.18 %	0.30 %	0.76 %	0.79 %	0.45 %
Swedish	0.55 %	1.51 %	1.45 %	1.58 %	1.93 %	1.28 %
Netherlands	0.97 %	0.67 %	0.91 %	1.41%	1.36 %	1.11 %
Norway	0.83 %	1.76 %	2.06 %	1.58 %	1.93 %	1.84 %
Denmark	0.28 %	0.48 %	0.73 %	0.88 %	0.74 %	1.06 %
Swiss	0.35 %	0.61 %	0.42 %	1.00 %	0.57 %	0.67 %
French	1.66 %	1.64 %	1.82 %	2.17 %	1.87 %	1.95 %
Others	1.91%	2.42%	2.6%	3.92%	4.4%	6.3%
Total	1,448	1,651	1,651	1,708	1,765	1,796

Table 1 reports the representation of ancestries across US state senates for years 1900, 1920, 1940, 1960, 1980, and 2000. All state senate members are summed up here, so these are the total number of state senators throughout the country.

dominance of state legislators reaches over 70%. This is despite the fact that as an ethnic group the English only made up 32% of the population by 1920. The English surnames were and continue to be overrepresented in state legislators.

Germans and the Irish were the next two largest ethnic groups represented in state senates, with each comprising 9%-10.5% of state senates between 1900 and 1940. Germans were slightly under represented during this time period (comprising 13% of the population in 1920) while the Irish were slightly over represented (comprising 8% of the population in 1920). It is important to note that state senates vary in terms of their size. Over and under representation of certain groups could be the result of their presence in states that had more or less seats than the national average.

Scandinavian surnames were widely distributed among various countries, including Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Switzerland, with no individual country comprising over 2% of state senators. When combined, Scandinavian countries comprise just over 6% of state legislators during 1920 and 1940.

The passage of the Civil Rights Act broke down barriers erected to prevent African Americans and other minority groups from both voting and running for public office. The post civil rights era show a rise in groups that were previously under-represented in state legislators and a fall in other groups. Despite consistently maintaining a rate of 10%-15% of the population, African-Americans

were systemically excluded from holding office in Post-Reconstruction America. Between 1900-1940 only two African-Americans held office in a state senate, and those states were Michigan and Nebraska. Their representation began increasing after Civil Rights laws were passed, increasing from .23% of state legislators in 1960 to nearly 5% in 2000, but they are still underrepresented with respect to their population rate.

Italians appear to be another large beneficiary of the 1960s' reforms. Although Italians comprised 4% of the population in 1920, only three individuals achieved elected state senate seats that year. California, Massachusetts, and New York each elected one Italian state senator. By the 1960s they comprised just under 2% of all state senators and, by 2000 had achieved nearly 6% of state senate seats despite their share of the population being under 5% during the same period.

The post-Civil Rights era saw an increased number of different ethnicities represented in public office. In 1940, 33 separate ethnicities were represented in state senates, compared to 48 identified ethnicities in 2000 state senates. This rise of ethnicities is offset by the fall in English representation. The English share of representation has decreased from 50% in 1960 to 39% in 2000, but they continue to be the most overrepresented group in state legislatures given their share of the population as a whole.

Over and under representation of certain ancestries at the national level may be driven by state specific demographics. States like Maine and New Hampshire have large English ancestry but make up a small portion of total US population. Despite this, their legislative bodies are just as large as large state. Since the pool of senators, they are drawing is restricted to their state one would expect groups overrepresented in these small states to be over represented in the national totals of state legislators. In order to get a better measure of representation we need break demographics down state by state.

{Section Forth Coming}

Ancestral Characteristics

With this information on surnames, I took the ancestral characteristics data gathered by Fulford, Petkov, and Schiantarelli (2021) and combined it with the state legislatures' data set to make a data set of the characteristics of each state legislature. These characteristics include state legislature versions of the State history and Trust variables used by Fulford, Petkov, and Schiantarelli (2021) and State Legislature version of the Technology Adoption variables used by Comin, Easterly, and Gong (2010). I also made a county measure of Technology Adoption using Fulford, Petkov, and Schiantarelli (2021) population estimates.

Another attempt to ascertain whether these estimates reflect a true change in the composition of state legislatures was to examine how these characteristics changed overtime relative to each state's underlying characteristics. One should expect the characteristics of the legislatures to start out higher than the states' overall scores and converge during or after the 1960s due to the repeal of Jim Crow and other discriminatory laws that had previously made it impossible for African-Americans and other minority groups to participate in the political process or hold office. Before the 1960s, southern states with large African-American populations affecting the states' national characteristics score did not demonstrate parallel reflections in the states' governments.

The graphs at the end of the paper show a clear convergence after 1960 in most of the states. The state legislature characteristics graph (the redline) starts out above the general population characteristics graph (the blueline) and eventually converges post 1960. The graphs demonstrating this convergence are in the appendix.

A potential problem with using state governments is the possibility that state governments have an insufficient independent effect on a county's economic outcomes. Most literature on public policy effects examines local governments as the major provider of public goods, such as schools and roads, and any policy change has a far more direct effect on local outcomes. However, literature on library building and disaster relief, by Kevane and Sundstrom (2016) and Feler and Senses (2007), has indicated that state government activities can have a sizable independent effect on local economic growth. State governments also make up a sizable funding source for local governments. Estimates indicate that approximately 32% of all local revenues are transfers from state governments. It is possible that changes in trust levels within state legislatures could shrink these funds, regulate them, or tie them to more rent seeking type programs at the expense of public goods provision.

Model:

I run a series of fixed effects regressions that took the form of:

$$Y_{ct} = \varnothing_c + \varnothing_{ct} + \alpha_{ct} + \beta Z_{ct} + \delta Y_{ct} + \beta_2 C_{ct} + \delta_2 S_{ct} + \epsilon_{ct}$$

Here Y_{ct} = log income per capita of county c at time t. \varnothing_{ct} controls for census division or region-specific year effects. Using state fixed effects is not done because it defeats the purpose of our experiment. We want to compare similar counties in different states. Region fixed effect is my preferred fixed effects control because it gives us the most variation. I tested the effect that a variety

of national characteristics of state legislatures βZ_{ct} had on Y_{ct} while controlling for its county equivalent characteristic δZ_{ct} . I also put in controls for time varying county $\beta_2 C_{ct}$ and state effects $\delta_2 S_{ct}$. These include the log of county populations, two lags of counties' log income per capita, State GDP per capita, and the fraction of native and African-Americans at the county level. The results are summarized in Table 1:

Table 2:

	LogGDP(1)	LogGDP(2)	LogGDP(3)	LogGDP(4)	LogGDP	LogGDP
County Trust	0.936*** (0.232)	0.759** (0.237)				
Legislator Trust	0.650*** (0.146)	0.575*** (0.154)				
County State History			0.445 (0.253)	0.344 (0.255)		
Legislator State History			0.514*** (0.151)	0.518*** (0.161)		
County Tech					0.688*** (0.0958)	0.572*** (0.0972)
Legislator Tech					0.0991** (0.0345)	0.0728 (0.0373)
Division FE	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Region FE	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
N	6208	6208	6208	6208	6208	6208

Table 2. Summarizes our Fixed Effects regression results. These results show the effect State Legislator Trust, State History, and Technology Level(Tech) have on counties log income per capita. We control for identical county characteristics of Trust, State History, and Technology Level. Models 1, 3, and 5 control for Census Region fixed effects. Models 2, 4, and 6 control for Census Division fixed effects. All 1-6 models have controls for Log Population, population density, 2 lags of log county income per capita, fraction of the counties population that is African American & Native American, and the counties state GDP per capita. . Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The results indicate that state legislatures' ethnic characteristics have independent effects on a county's economy regardless of the county's ethnic characteristics. The ancestral state history of the legislature is more important than the counties' population state history. Population Technology adoption is the most important characteristic of all our variables, but it doesn't appear to be as important within state legislatures. Controlling for division fixed effects, it is not statistically significant. Trust is shown to be significant and of similar values with both region and division fixed effects.

One explanation for this variation could be that certain cultural characteristics are more important in the public sphere than in the private sphere and vice versa. State history could be important for law makers as it leads to better political decision making but does not have much separate influence in the private sphere. In contrast, Technology History could mainly influence growth through the private sector through its effect on innovation. Trust could be equally important in both sectors

which would explain why they are significant at both levels.

Conclusion:

These ancestral cultures and values have been demonstrated to be important for economic growth. Not enough research has been done to attempt to estimate the relative importance of these characteristics when they are expressed in different domains of society. Here I attempt to see how these cultures and values affect economic outcomes through their effect within the public sphere. I have designed a unique dataset of the ancestral demographics of the state legislatures in the US. I use this dataset to see how ancestral differences in legislative bodies affect similar counties' economic outcome. My results indicate that ancestral and cultural traits, such as trust and state history, are independently important in the public sphere for economic growth. Future research on this topic would seek better measures of legislatures' ancestry or use other techniques, such as border analysis, to further assess the veracity of these effects. It would also be useful to study how these characteristics affect individual legislators' voting patterns.

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